- Geopolitical Strategist
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Episode notes
Our experts discuss how the Iran conflict and AI-driven demand affect the outlook for oil, commodities, inflation, and energy security.
2:10 – Pre-war oil outlook
3:35 – Revised outlook for oil
7:00 – AI and an oil supercycle
9:50 – Critical importance of the Strait of Hormuz
11:30 – Downstream effects across supply chains
14:50 – Oil and energy market volatility
16:45 – Geopolitical implications
21:00 – Fertilizers, metals, and LNG
25:30 – Effects on the energy transition
28:10 – What to watch
Transcript
Elise Backman: I think one of the reasons that this crisis potentially is more dramatically felt by the physical market ― apart from the importance of Hormuz ― is that it's happening when the oil market has not fully recovered from 2022, from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. You're already dealing with one crisis, and now you've added a second and potentially more severe crisis on top of it. So, it's further amplifying the volatility in that market. In addition to that, because commodities markets are incrementally interconnected, because of macro shifts, such as AI, I think what you're seeing is a stronger crossover effect of what's happening in oil markets to other markets as well.
Thomas Mucha: As with all wars, markets are watching events in Iran unfold in real time, trying to determine what they may mean on a day-to-day basis. But, and again, with all wars, it's the long term economic and geopolitical impacts that are likely to matter most to investors. So, joining me today to discuss these long-term effects is Elise Backman, commodities portfolio manager here at Wellington.
Elise’s expertise spans petroleum, metals, agriculture, biofuels, and environmental markets. Now, with the war affecting every single one of those, I think she's the perfect guest right now to walk us through what's happening now in all of these markets and what to watch for in the coming months. So, Elise, welcome to well, WellSaid.
Elise Backman: Thank you, Thomas. Happy to be here.
Thomas Mucha: So, Elise, before the start of the war, your commodities team saw the oil market in surplus, with downward price pressure, at least for the near term. So, what were the key drivers of that view?
Elise Backman: Yeah, absolutely. It's been quite the change over the past few months versus what expectations were heading into this year. So, heading into the year, our team had about a 2 million barrel a day surplus. So, to put that into context, the oil market is about 100 million barrels a day big. So, about 2% of the market surplus, which is pretty large versus history, but definitely smaller than some consensus forecasters had, which was on the order of around 4 million barrels a day ― pretty sizable.
And that growth of that surplus was really driven by inelastic supply growth coming from a number of countries that had projects in the works for about a decade at this point, and those projects were finally coming to fruition. Those projects included cut from countries like Brazil, like Guyana, and those projects were going to come online no matter what. It didn't really matter what the price of oil was going to be; you would see that supply be introduced in 2026.
The demand side of the equation was pretty steady. State. Not an explosive year for demand growth. Not a bad year either. And so that in conjunction with this inelastic supply growth was really leading to a pretty strong potential rebuild in inventories that was forecasted for this year.
Thomas Mucha: Okay. So that was a nice set of variables that didn't come to be. Obviously we've had this hot-and-cold conflict now in Iran, across the Middle East. So, I assume by now you've already revised your outlook. So, tell me now about that and how the situation has changed your views, both for the near but also the medium term?
Elise Backman: Yeah, it definitely has been quite a change. So, what I would say is the crisis that we're seeing unfold in Iran has expedited what we thought would be the kind of oil supercycle for prices that we expected to enter heading into the end of this decade. So that Brazilian and Guyanan supply that I mentioned earlier, that supply growth was really supposed to kind of stall out at some point in early 2027. And at that point, we still saw a pretty steady state of demand growth happening, but no more supply being added. What the Iranian crisis has done has really expedited that narrative and pulled it forward by reducing the amount of inventories that we have built over the past year and pushing oil prices higher as a result.
So, when I look at our balances ― and obviously it's a very fluid situation, given the fact that Hormuz is still closed ― we're looking around at a 500,000 barrel a day, full year deficit, which we expect to really be driven by really steep deficits in the first half of this year and then somewhat reduced amount of deficit, moving into surplus by the end of the year. But if you take the full calendar year average, you're looking at about 500,000 barrels a day, which is aligned with a Brent price somewhere in the mid-90s or so.
Thomas Mucha: So, Elise, oil is elevated. The price of oil is elevated as a part of this conflict, but it's not at the levels where a lot of the most pessimistic forecasts have been. Why do you think that is?
Elise Backman: We are actually seeing a really strong disconnect at the moment between the oil futures market ― what everybody sees on their screens at home ― versus what's happening in the physical market. In some physical markets in oil ― Omani crude, Dubai crude ― we've seen those oils trade up to $150 during the duration of this conflict. Likewise, we've seen different indicators, for the North Sea, which is where Brent is priced, we've seen those crudes trade up to $130. I think the reason for that mainly is because physical market traders are the ones that are actually participating in purchasing crudes like Omani crude or dated Brent and things of that nature. We don't really see as much investors or speculators participating in those markets. So, there's a little bit of a difference in stakeholders.
The second is that the futures market, as one can expect, tends to be a bit more anticipatory. So, I think you're seeing some traders try to trade ahead of concerns around demand destruction, or the potential for there to be a very rapid ceasefire and renormalization of flows through the Strait, both of which we obviously haven't seen meaningfully occur yet. And I think those are the reasons that you're really seeing that disconnect. Importantly, if this crisis persists, I do expect there has to be a reconciliation moment between what's happening in that physical market and those indicators and what we're seeing on our screens at home. You're going to need to see those two ends meet at a certain point.
Thomas Mucha: The commodities team leader, David Chang joined me on the show back in December. And of course, he was talking about the supercycle for oil that you just mentioned. You know, David described the contours of this next supercycle as being driven by higher demand, but this time by AI hyperscalers, which obviously have a voracious appetite for energy.
AI has been a dominant theme in the markets and continues to be a dominant theme, and these hyperscalers are willing to pay for it. So, how have the events over the past couple of months recalibrated your team's views specifically on this next oil supercycle?
Elise Backman: Yeah, it's really pulled that narrative forward effectively. So the supercycle, you know, driven by AI, but also driven by incremental energy needs coming from a variety of sources, is going to pull on oil mainly from a second-order basis because it's increasing our global power needs and because those global power needs need to be met by things like gas and nuclear and other sources, because that overall number is going higher, it's likewise going to pull your oil demand that is used for power grids to a certain extent, higher as well.
And that's coming about at the same time that you're still seeing normal kind of oil sources for demand coming from industrial transportation needs, etc. So, it basically just makes a more robust picture for the demand story in oil, which a few years ago people were thinking, we're kind of reaching the tail end of growth because of electric vehicles, because of kind of other headwinds to oil demand. We're now probably looking at a more steady state, 1-million-barrel-a-day growth narrative, at least, you know, for the next several years. And why this is a supercycle is because we just don't have enough suppliers in the market. So, again, that price-inelastic supply growth for Brazil and Guyana, that's coming to an end. But likewise the key suppliers to the market, which right now we're, you know, confined by what's going on in Hormuz ― so the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait ― the countries that you typically think of being able to turn on the taps and increase their spare capacity relatively easily because of the friendly geology in the region, they are too running out of spare capacity. So, it's our estimate that, setting aside Hormuz for a moment, assuming that flows are normal, these countries only have about 3 to 4 million barrels a day of spare capacity to draw down on.
And that sounds like a big number. But in the context of oil demand that's growing 1 million barrels a day per year, at least for the next few years without any other supply growth, it's actually not. And so that's why you really need to see oil prices, especially in the back end of the forward curve, move higher to send a signal to suppliers that says: Hey, we're not actually reaching the end of demand for oil, it's not what we thought. We actually need more supply to be introduced to the market. We need more capital expenditures to come about in this industry and increase supply.
When we're talking about, you know, potential supply shocks in one market, it can lead to second- and third-order effects in these other markets, leading to kind of broader inflation across the entire energy complex.x
Thomas Mucha: Makes perfect sense. So, Elise, you mentioned the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20% of the world's oil passes. So, this issue has emerged, unsurprisingly, as a focal point for markets. But it's not just oil that flows through this narrow passage, of course ― and we'll talk about that more in a minute. But for now, Elise, tell me why the constricted flow of crude through the Strait of Hormuz is so systematically important to the global economy.
Elise Backman: The closure of Hormuz has been something that's been discussed by oil observers or oil investors like myself for decades. It's been kind of the fuel of nightmares, if you will, within the oil markets for quite a long time. And no one really thought that it would one day actually occur.
But let’s put some numbers on it ― 20% of the world's oil and refined products flow through the Strait. That is an enormous number that cannot be replaced by the likes of Russia, by the likes of West Africa, any other kind of center points for oil and refined products is really in this region, and there aren't really a lot of outs apart from the Strait of Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia, which arguably has been, the best positioned among the Gulf countries as a result of this crisis ― because of its availability of land-based storage, but also, importantly, because they do have a pipeline that can move crude from their oil producing regions in the east to the west, to where the Red sea is ― they haven't been involved. But obviously that can change any day, given that it's quite a fluid situation. But even that pipeline, that can only do an extra 5 million barrels a day or so of capacity versus what was being done pre-crisis. So, it doesn't really solve the problem of: we have 20 million barrels a day of oil and refined product to replace. It's just not an easy logistical feat. And that's why you're seeing such a severe reaction in prices and such a severe reaction in broader markets.
Thomas Mucha: Right. That's a hard number to replace on a day-to-day basis. But even if the Strait becomes totally open and safe again, let's say tomorrow. Elise, how long would this crisis last? And, you know, how are you thinking about the downstream effects across the oil and energy supply chains?
Elise Backman: I think that's the most important question bothering oil investors and broader market participants at the moment. In terms of duration, I think the most important thing to consider is that the production that has been curtailed because of the absence of land-based storage in the region ― or relatively curtailed amount ― that production cannot come back immediately as the trade reopens.
There are certain countries ― like Saudi, like the UAE ― that are relatively well positioned to be able to produce again quite quickly. But other countries ― like Kuwait, for example, like Iraq potentially as well ― may have a greater difficulty in increasing that oil production because of dilapidated infrastructure, management concerns, things of that nature, which mean it may take a few months for that production to renormalize.
I will caveat by saying, at least until this point, upstream assets have not been physically damaged, missiles have not bombed upstream fields or things of that nature. Most of the physical damage has been contained to refineries themselves and downstream assets, which is why I think it will take much, much longer for the oil product space, for refinery margins and refinery cracks to find a more normal level relative to oil. If all things go back to normal in the Strait, we're looking at a few months before that, those upstream assets are back up and running, per normal.
Thomas Mucha: What if we have an outcome to this conflict where the IRGC maintains its ability to threaten shipping through the Strait? What does that mean, in your view, to geopolitical premia on energy prices going forward, if that's the outcome that we get?
Elise Backman: I think it sets a really dangerous precedent for waterways globally and I think it's going to ― or it would ― increase the amount of geopolitical premium that would need to be tacked on to what is fair-value model for oil because it’s usually derived from some form of inventory calculation. I think it's going to need to expand that premium. Well, would stop, say, the Houthis, from doing the same thing in the Red Sea.
What would stop, a state or non-state actor from doing the same in certain parts of East Asia, right? Like, I think those are the questions that you need to really ask yourself. And it creates this asymmetry, Thomas, that you and I have talked about, in terms of state actors being able to basically do battle with larger state actors because they can hold the world hostage by a key economic waterways. I think that's why, at least publicly, I think it's unlikely that the US and other powers would allow Iran to control international waterways in that way.
Thomas Mucha: Yeah, I think that's the main lesson here ― or one of the main lessons ― from the Iran conflict, which is this asymmetric use of economic, strategic choke points. And those exist, as you say, all over the world. They exist in East Asia, they exist in the Taiwan Strait. They exist in the in the Red Sea and elsewhere. So, to me, that's something that investors are going to have to come to terms with, and that's why I think the resolution of this conflict and how it plays out is so important.
Now, looking back, Elise, at sort of recent history, energy markets have endured a lot of shocks since 2020 ― COVID demand collapse, the Russia-Ukraine supply, shock, we had last year's tariffs from the Trump administration, and now this. So, how do these shocks, one after another, affect oil and energy market volatility? And what do you think it means for commodities as a traditional inflation hedge?
Elise Backman: So, I think two things. I think when you see a number of shocks occur within a small period of time ― so you see the cadence of those shocks increasing ― you're going to see increased volatility in the asset class. That's kind of an easy conclusion. But you're also going to reduce the cover, the inventory that you have, the ability to absorb the subsequent shock, which is kind of a self-fulfilling cycle because it further increases the volatility of that shock.
So, I think one of the reasons that this crisis potentially is more dramatically felt by the physical market ― apart from the importance of Hormuz ― is that it's happening when the oil market has not fully recovered from 2022, from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. You're still not seeing a full renormalization of freight, you're still not seeing a renormalization of the use of the so-called ghost fleet to get around sanctions, right? You're already dealing with one crisis, and now you've added a second and potentially more severe crisis on top of it. So, it's further amplifying the volatility in that market. In addition to that, because commodities markets are incrementally interconnected, because of macro shifts, such as AI, I think what you're seeing is a stronger crossover effect of what's happening in oil markets to other markets as well.
I'll bring up a market such as aluminum, which I think often gets kind of lost in the weeds of what's going on, but it's actually dramatically important. 10% of the world's aluminum is produced in this region. Aluminum requires alumina and gas to be able to be created, which flows through Hormuz. And so you're seeing the effects of what's going on in the oil market pour over to what's happening in aluminum markets as well, which then, you know, impacts manufacturing and those second- and third-order effects, too. I think bigger volatility swings, but also a broader breadth of impacts across the different commodity markets needs to be considered as a result of these subsequent shocks.
Thomas Mucha: Yeah, I think the second- and third-order impacts are significant. And when you have a conflict that rages in the center of the world's energy-supply geography, you're going to get these impacts. And I don't think markets were fully prepared for a duration conflict that was going to have the second- and third-order impacts.
So, let's pull the lens back a little bit, Elise. And you know, I want to focus for a minute on the geopolitical the geostrategic implications. And you know, I see this conflict as, you know, it's less to me a point of point in time event risk and more of, part of this ongoing and increasing geopolitical risk that we've already suggested could drive a structural premia for oil.
And for my perspective, this war has accelerated shifts in great power competition between, obviously, the United States and China. It's causing Japan, many countries in Europe, India, and Russia, to refocus their geopolitical strategies. I think it's likely to further disrupt what has already been pretty fragile relations among the Gulf states. And potentially the Gulf states with the US. So, I'm curious, do you share this view? And if so, how do you expect markets will price this structural geopolitical risk once we get through the end of the current Iran crisis?
Elise Backman: I do share the view. I think it will be difficult for the market to return to a pre-crisis norm, and I think you're still seeing a broader impulse in the market to try to price back in pre-crisis norms. But I think that that is misplaced for a number of reasons. One, because it ignores, as you said, the great power competition that's likely to continue and potentially worsen as a result of this crisis. Two, because it ignores the potential likelihood for incremental internal strife within these different countries as a result of this crisis, particularly in Iran, right? The market, I think, is still relying on Iranian production being able to go back to where it was producing in January and February of this year. And I just don't think that that's likely, given the possibility for civil concerns as a result of this crisis. And I think you're already seeing some signs of that.
So, I think, broadly speaking, it's going to be very difficult on both ends to see production or for the oil market to go back to where it was before the crisis. But I also think as a result of this crisis and the fact that countries continue to see, themselves basically being held hostage by the Straits of Hormuz being closed, or kind of things of that nature, I think there's a greater desire for energy-supply security. We're certainly seeing that dominate the critical minerals space, right? Thomas, you've spoken quite a bit about batteries number of years. I think you're seeing you've seen it in energy as a result of 2022 and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I think you're going to see it again here. And so, my expectation is that you're going to see countries try to develop their own sources where possible, or used French wiring where, they don't have the geology to support their own energy security.
I think you're going to see more of that, which means costs are going to go higher because we can't produce commodities, at the same inexpensive prices that we see in the Middle East. We can't do that in every region, which means costs across commodities for suppliers are probably going to go higher, and you're going to see more countries reach for that dynamic as a result.
Thomas Mucha: Yeah, I completely agree. I think we're headed towards a much more fragmented world where national security is a more dominant policy priority, which means governments are more accepting of protection and promotion of strategic sectors, which to me means a structurally higher inflation backdrop. And it probably a structurally lower growth, outlook than we had relative to the heyday of globalization. So, yeah, I think there, policymakers around the world are, are being reminded once again of the strategic importance of energy in all forms. I want to dig a little bit deeper, Elise, you know, into something you mentioned earlier about the Strait of Hormuz, not only as a critical waterway for oil, but for, you know, all these other commodities. So, you know, how are you thinking about the delay or the reduction in supplies of, let's say, fertilizers, metals, and, a really big one, liquefied natural gas. What does that mean for industries and economies that rely on all of these?
Elise Backman: Most people perceive Hormuz as an oil waterway, but the reality is oil only represents a subset of what actually flows through there and what's produced in the region.
So on, on the fertilizer front, it's dramatically impactful for nitrogen-based fertilizers because of the quantity of urea and other key ingredients that flow through Hormuz ― it's over 40% of global exports of urea flow through that Strait. And nitrogen is a particularly important type of fertilizer for corn crop specifically. And so that's one that we're watching quite carefully on our team at the moment, because the operating costs for farmers, for corn, over 30% of that is driven by fertilizer costs alone, which is pretty dramatic.
And so we're coming into the planting season here in the US for farmers. Fortunately for the US, most farmers procured their fertilizer back in November or December. So, you might look at like a 10 to 15% loss of normal fertilizer application versus norm. But if we get bad weather, dry weather in July, that 10% could end up mattering a great deal.
When I'm looking at a little bit further out, more medium term for corn is what this means for Brazil and for South American farmers for the next planting cycle. Brazil is 90% dependent on imports for fertilizer, they’re just dramatically dependent. And so, if they're not able to import fertilizers ― which they typically tend to do around June, July ― and if this crisis is still going on by that point in time, I think you're potentially going to have to entertain a dramatic, reduction in acreage growth assumptions for next year. It's very important, given that Brazil's the second biggest corn producer in the world at this moment.
Apart from fertilizers, Thomas, you talked a little bit about metals. I mean, we talked about aluminum earlier in the conversation. In addition to that, copper comes to mind because of the amount of sulfur that goes through the Strait and that's needed producers in West Africa of copper, given the production mechanisms that exist there.
Thomas Mucha: Yeah, it's interesting what you said about fertilizer. And, you know, obviously there are humanitarian aspects of this, food production aspects of it. There's also domestic political implications as well, because there's no better indicator throughout history, of political outcomes as inflation and particularly food inflation. And so, you know, I think the longer this goes on and we talked about the second- and third-order impacts, but domestic political instability in a lot of these countries, I think the probability of that goes up the longer this conflict goes on. And then, Elise, onto that LNG aspect.
Elise Backman: Yeah, we need to talk about LNG. That's obviously an important one. So, I think it's important here to distinguish what's going on today versus 2022. Obviously, Qatar is an incredibly important supplier of LNG. The waterway is a key, key strait for LNG being supplied to broader markets. But I think the difference here is that first, the supply that's been impacted thus far in Qatar, the expectations are for that to actually be repaired relatively quickly. You're probably looking at somewhere between 12 to 18 months, which I think is a little bit out of consensus. But our view in the firm is that that supply can come back online relatively quickly. So that's one piece why we don't think it's going to be like a 2022-type of impact on global gas prices.
The second key piece is that we're heading into the summer months in Europe, as opposed to heading into the winter, and so you're going to see less seasonal demand. You don't need to heat your homes and heat your buildings and schools. So, less demand pull as a result. So probably not the same type of price response, for Europe fighting with Asia effectively for those LNG cargoes.
The third key piece here is that Asia is likely to draw down on their coal inventories. We've already started to see that happening. And because they're doing that, they're going to have less of a need for gas as a result, leaving those LNG cargoes to Europe to be consumed. So, all told, still a supportive environment for LNG, but nothing like we saw in 2022.
Thomas Mucha: So of course, at least climate change through the national security, through the geopolitics lens, that's a recurring frame on this podcast. So, under that issue, how do you think a prolonged period of higher oil prices will affect specifically the energy transition? Carbon markets, electricity, biodiesel and other substitutes. And in your view, does that accelerate diversification away from petroleum fuels?
Elise Backman: An important question. And let's not forget that we're heading into the summer months, which are the hottest months in the Middle East, which is still quite reliant on oil for power grid generation, to be able to power ACs. So, I think this crisis is particularly relevant and even in an acute sense, given the months that we're heading into just for the comfort of those actually living in the region.
But more broadly speaking, I think this crisis is absolutely going to accelerate energy-transition spending. And I think you're repositioning energy transition spending as not just a climate lens, but now an energy-security and supply lens. If you look at clean energy spending, you actually spend the largest amount of capital flow into the space between 2023 and 2022, year on year. And that wasn't because climate change substantially changed at that point. There wasn't really new technology. What happened, the change was Russia invaded Ukraine. And so, energy security and supply security, I think is the aim. That's really going to change policy here.
So, yes, I think renewables is going to play a key importance. Over the past four years, we've really stepped up our efforts from a technological perspective in terms of batteries and lowering that growth. So, I expect that growth to continue, and for a renewable cost to go lower and thus for interest to increase. Likewise, biofuels, I think, will play an important role, especially in economies that have a large agricultural base like Brazil, like Indonesia, to a certain extent, the US as well, they will play an incremental role, especially in displacing diesel demand, which has been really tricky, to be able to do within the broader oil barrel and oil space.
And then the third piece, which we haven't talked too much about, is nuclear and the role that that plays in baseload power. I think that you will see even more countries kind of jump on the bandwagon there. And that will, of course, benefit uranium is the key metal used to develop that energy.
Thomas Mucha: Yeah, I'm also in that camp of all energy all the time, and certainly in the camp that, policymakers are viewing energy through this strategic lens. And so, the additional disruptions that we're seeing from the Iran conflict, I agree, is going to increase policymaker priorities on renewables across the board.
Alright, Elise, as we wrap up this fascinating conversation, I've got two questions for you. The first is: What's the duration of this conflict ― how are you thinking about that aspect of it before it begins to really impact the US and other key economies? And then second, what are the key signposts that you'll be monitoring along the way to help determine those impacts?
Elise Backman: I'm glad we're talking about this point. Let me try to tackle the kind of demand destruction/when this impacts other economies question first. So, it's already happening in Asia, which makes sense given the geographical proximity. Right. We're already seeing factory shutdowns in India. We're seeing four-day work weeks in parts of Southeast Asia. Likewise, from a school-day perspective, we're already seeing remote learning be instituted. So, this is already being felt in Asia. And that certainly makes sense given the relatively lower amount of inventories that these countries tend to run versus other parts of the OECD as well as its geographic proximity to, to Iran and to the Strait of Hormuz.
As far as broader economies, Europe, the US, Europe, I think is next in the chopping block. I think it's quite likely that you're going to see particularly European aviation be impacted in a short period of time, given the low level of inventories of jet fuel, the prices of jet fuel as well. I think within the next few weeks, you're going to start to see curtailment in flights and impacts to the aviation sector.
For the broader industrial sector, which is obviously being acutely impacted because of the distillate-leaning impact due to this crisis, I think you're going to start to see that really bite toward July, toward the mid part of this summer, assuming that firm moves remain shut, you're going to start to see that impact European economies, particularly the industrial side of Europe.
And then within the US, I think the US is the most insulated relative to other economies as a result of this conflict. There’s two reasons for that. One, the US has a greater level of inventories relative to other countries in terms of land-based storage. And the second reason is the US is predominantly a gasoline-powered transportation economy as opposed to a diesel-based transportation economy. And because this crisis is acutely impacting the distillate part of the barrel as opposed to the gasoline part of the barrel, I expect you're not going to see as much of an impact on the US, or certainly the US would be the last one impacted relative to these other regions.
Thomas Mucha: Now, what about those signposts then?
Elise Backman: Yeah, on the signposts, I mean, you’ve got to track inventories ― that's the key thing. Likewise tracking how long it takes different countries to refill their strategic petroleum reserves, especially in the back half of this year and into 2027, that's really important because that basically amplifies demand in order to refill those strategic inventories. Those are key signposts.
And then on the demand side, continuing to watch what's happening in refinery cracks and refinery margins, continuing to watch what's happening on the demand destruction front in terms of factories being shut in schools moving to remote learning, that's going to be key signposts to track, too.
Thomas Mucha: Elise, thank you for that magisterial display of knowledge across the entire commodities landscape, tying it all together for us. And I think we've come up with maybe 15 or 20 reasons why this war should end soon. And let's hope that this war ends soon. But once again, Elise Backman, Commodities Portfolio Manager here at Wellington, thanks so much for joining us on WellSaid.
Elise Backman: Thank you so much for having me, Thomas.
Views expressed are those of the speaker(s) and are subject to change. Other teams may hold different views and make different investment decisions. For professional/institutional investors only. Your capital may be at risk. Podcast produced May 2026.
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