- Geopolitical Strategist
Portugal, Institutional
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Episode notes
Host Thomas Mucha and guests Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson and Andy Heiskell unpack what today’s geopolitics, valuations, and concentration mean for strategic allocation — and why diversification may matter more again.
2:45 – What are the two truths of US exceptionalism?
5:45 – Valuations: Advantage or risk?
9:55 – Fiscal and debt dynamics
14:45 – The USD
15:45 – Policy-driven investment themes
18:40 – Changing correlations
24:35 – The strategic role of gold and commodities
30:45 – The return of diversification
Transcript
Andy Heiskell: We were taught that diversification is the only free lunch. And investing. And it's been a free lunch that's given investors indigestion for the last decade. Right. So we stopped doing it. I think we have to go back to that free lunch and say, now we have something, a gift in our hands that we need to take advantage of in this. Diversification matters across everything. It matters across countries, across regions, across sectors, across styles, factors, everything. And I think investors really need to lean into this because just as we've seen over the course of the last year, diversification has the ability maybe even to enhance returns and reduce volatility.
Thomas Mucha: The concept of US exceptionalism is based on an 80-year history of US economic, geopolitical, and military dominance that's driven dollar primacy, powered US financial markets, and for the most part, supported global stability. Now, while most of these dynamics still hold, it's also true that the world and the US face growing turbulence in many forms: expanding regional conflicts, economic instability, and waning policy cohesion. The effects of this emerging dichotomy on capital markets are beginning to take shape, and asset allocators need to understand what the two truths of US exceptionalism — namely, it still holds and it’s waning — may mean for them. So, to help me break down all of this are close colleagues of mine who happen to be two of Allington, most experienced and prolific market watchers, Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson, a multi-asset strategist, and Andy Heiskell, our chief equity strategist. Nanette, Andy, welcome to you both. And thanks for being here on the WellSaid podcast.
Nanette: Thank you, Thomas. It's a pleasure to be here.
Andy: Yeah, thanks for having us.
Thomas Mucha: All right, Nanette, let's start with you and our favorite topic, the big picture. So as I said in my intro, as a team, we've argued that US exceptionalism is both intact and waning at the same time. So from your perspective, what does that paradox mean for asset allocators who are trying to set strategic weights over the next, let's say, 5 to 10 years?
Nanette: Thanks so much, Thomas, for the question. And it's sort of an existential question, I would say. I really have keyed in to Mark Carney's speech at the World Economic Forum, and he basically warned countries to become more independent in terms of their supply chains and also in terms of their military preserving sovereignty, etc. So it was a call to action, and I interpreted that as a call to action for allocators as well, to hedge their portfolio to some extent based on the idea that there would be some decline in US exceptionalism.
Now, we have to certainly acknowledge that at this moment we're in the Middle East conflict and US exceptionalism has in many ways reasserted itself. The dollar is up. Gold is actually down, and US equities are outperforming. So, I would say that for the long term, you do have to keep these two truths in sight. For waning US exceptionalism, I do think that having allocations to non-US equities and particularly emerging markets, is one of the areas that needs to be looked at and needs to possibly evolve. The second thing is that we've been asserting that inflation could be higher and stickier, in the next 5 to 10 years for assorted reasons. If allocators think that US exceptionalism will stay intact ― and we certainly believe that ― there are areas of the US market that you may want to keep in your portfolio, certainly US equities in particular. We think artificial intelligence and the technology revolution that we're in is something to emphasize. And then, for either scenario, you want to have exposure to active management, where you can take advantage of the volatility and dispersion that we're seeing more frequently, in the markets and also more specifically multi-sector hedge funds. These are all seeking to take advantage of dispersion in stocks and sectors.
And within fixed income. I know we'll talk about this more, since fixed income is less reliable, a hedge for equities when they sell off, we really are thinking more about dynamic fixed income strategies that can move their duration, move their sectors around, and be more tactical as this new world evolves.
Thomas Mucha: I keyed into that Mark Carney speech as well, when it's coming from your most traditional long-term ally who sits on your northern border, you know, that really resonated with me as well.
So, Andy, honing in on your area of expertise. Markets continue to price the US as structurally advantaged, especially in equities. So, at what point do elevated valuations stop being a sign of durable advantage and start becoming a source of portfolio risk? The valuation question.
Andy Heiskell: Well, thanks again for having me along. I guess I keep coming back to the happiness equation where, satisfaction equals outcomes minus expectations. And US equities have been truly exceptional the last decade plus really since the financial crisis, because the outcomes have continued to exceed expectations.
And if we roll back the clock, it's hard to imagine. But in 2011, US equities troughed at 11 times forward price to earnings multiple. Today there around 19 times after the selloff in the market. But not that long ago they were 23 times forward earnings. So you had a near doubling of the P/E multiple of US equities, very well supported, though, by fundamentals where US corporations were driving exceptional profit growth and beyond that exceptional free cash flow growth. And so we're really demanding a higher valuation for that exceptional growth and profitability and the free cash flow.
Well, where does that become a problem. It becomes a problem if expectations get too high. And what does a high P/E multiple mean? It means there's expectations around future growth prospects as well as the durability of that growth. And what we just heard from Nanette, I think, raises a very fair question around both of those that certain the starting point of valuations is hard to replicate what we had 15 years ago. And all of these questions that are arising around the role of the US in the global economy, the volatility that's been introduced, I think, draws into question around those future prospects of growth and the certainty and volatility around that, which does mean that that starting point on valuation becomes a potential double-edged sword at this point.
Thomas Mucha: So, Andy, US equity exceptionalism, has increasingly been driven by, let's say, a narrow set of large capital-lite tech firms. So how should allocators think about concentration risk, when the same companies dominate equity benchmarks, earnings growth, innovation spending and all the other factors that we look at?
Andy Heiskell: Okay, let's level set some of the facts today. There's more ETFs in the United States than there are listed companies. I think that the traditional premise of passive investing was low-cost, buy-and-hold diversification. Most of these ETFs today are certainly not buy and hold. Many of them aren't even low cost. And many of them are certainly not diversified. And even if you say, well, the S&P 500 itself, okay, yes, you can have exposure to the S&P 500 in a low-cost fashion, and you can buy and hold that. But the index itself is no longer diversified, right? With tech, nearly 40% of the index tech at large with AI included well over half of the index today. And so I think we need to draw a very distinctive differentiation between passive investing and passive decision making. And I don't think there's any passive decision making in markets today.
And just let's think of a simple example of this. You can own the S&P 500 cheaply, efficiently in two easy forms. You can own the index in its index weight, or you can own the S&P 500 equal-weighted. There's ETFs exist for both, same cost for both. The composition of those are the same underlying 500 securities. But because of the weights being so different, the outcome that you get as an investor in those is a very, very different outcome.
So, which one do you own? That is an active decision. Now you can express that maybe in a passive vehicle, but I think that we're in this moment of time, given the concentration within the US market, given the concentration of US within global equity markets ― now US, two thirds of global equity market cap ― that there's very active decisions that allocators are making all across the board.
Now, they might again think they're expressing that in a passive form. Yes, they are. But that's a very active decision. And we have to be very cognizant around what risks that introduces into our portfolios.
Thomas Mucha: So, Nanette, let's pull the lens out a little bit further here. So, US fiscal sustainability is becoming harder to ignore, even as growth remains relatively strong. So, when do fiscal and debt dynamics move from a background concern to a first-order asset allocation input? And I mean this across equities rates and currencies. This is a question that I get from clients all the time by the way. So, give me a good answer.
Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson: Yes sure. I'll give you a good answer. So, let's just level set. The US fiscal deficit ― primary deficit ― is about 7% of GDP. That is the hundredth percentile relative to developed market deficits. So we're running at huge levels of debt. And if you want to put that, from a public debt percentage, we're at around 100% debt to GDP, that is the highest it's been since World War II.
And so, you know, clearly ― and I think this is probably a question I get all the time from clients is when does that become an issue? And I would argue it has already become an issue. And we've seen that most notably in the UK. Everyone remembers the Truss moment when Prime Minister Truss was in that position for all of three minutes.
But she had announced basically a series of tax cuts which were not funded. And so, the market revolted at that. And the bond markets soared in response to basically fiscal irresponsibility. So we've seen examples that in the United States, as well, we've seen it in France. UK is certainly most sensitive to that.
This is the term premium that many market participants talk about, right. And that term premium right now is rather low in the United States. So, the question is when does when does it become recognized? And I would argue that the decline that we saw of about 10% of the dollar in 2025 is reflective of concern about fiscal sustainability in the US.
And, what's the problem from an economic standpoint? Our interest expense is as large as the US defense budget. So when you're talking about numbers that size, obviously the economic impact is that money can't go to productive uses. It has to go to pay our debt down. Which I think is a problem, right, for the economy and society.
And so where do I see this really showing up? I think it will show up, in episodic periods of higher interest rates, particularly at the long end. I do think that we are in a secular decline in the dollar, even though this year, the dollar is up. As I mentioned earlier, we are in a really unique situation geopolitically speaking. But the direction of travel is weaker for the dollar. So that's how I expect it to show up in markets.
Thomas Mucha: What signposts would you look for a Truss movement here in the United States?
Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson: Well, I think the next phase of fiscal spending is going to be scrutinized by the market. And will it be, you know, because of high gas prices, will there be direct handouts, something like that I think would probably be a catalyst for rates to go higher. So those are the two. I mean, the most real time indicators will be rates and FX.
But anything that really looks like direct handouts is going to be a pressure for the market.
Thomas Mucha: Nanette, you mentioned the dollar and the question of the dollar as the reserve currency around the world comes up a lot in my geopolitical conversations. I agree that we've started to see a bit of erosion in US-dollar dominance in some global portfolios. And I think it's a core piece of how I'm thinking about the geopolitical backdrop. It's a core piece of how I'm thinking about this US exceptionalism question, because it really was US dollar dominance that that came as a result of US exceptionalism across the national security landscape.
And what I've seen is that, yes, there are questions around the world about the dollar. But there aren't quite yet easy ways for countries to transact out of the dollar reserve system. The de-dollarization of certain economies, China in particular, really is a result of what the US has done post-Ukraine and how the US weaponized the dollar. And so I think we have a combination here of countries, particularly China, trying to reduce that risk of the dollar being weaponized. But at the same time trying to open up new channels for and new trading opportunities for the RMB.
You've seen, you know, actions by the Chinese government to open up rate swaps and currency swaps around the world. So, to me, there is a connection here, between this US exceptionalism and the long-term role of the dollar. I don't see it as an immediate risk. But it's one of these things that that I'm watching and getting a lot of questions about.
Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson: I think what's interesting, Thomas, is just, you know, you can never look at currencies in isolation and also infrastructure and the fact that China is building that infrastructure basically the rails to be able to transact in RMB. It's we're at the early stages for sure, but again, the direction of travel is clear. And other currencies will eventually put some pressure on the dollar.
Thomas Mucha: The guts of the system have to be built, but the signs are increasingly clear. Andy, I want to bring you back into the conversation here. Policymakers around the world are increasingly prioritizing national security, sometimes at the expense of economic efficiency. They're accepting of more inflation. And we're seeing more use of economic tools and tariffs and other measures.
So how should allocators translate these emerging national security priorities into investable themes without simply overpaying for defense or politically fashionable sectors?
Andy Heiskell: So, I would recommend maybe starting by broadening the lens a little bit just beyond national defense. We're in a in a world and a society now where political drivers and objectives are driving economic decisions, national defense being preeminent within that, but even beyond that.
In prior work experience, I used to run a global financials fund, and once a year or twice a year I would go to visit China and would visit with the Chinese banks and Chinese insurance companies. And as an investor or a potential investor in the Chinese financial institutions, you always knew very clearly that they were tools of public policy. The Chinese banks were part of the state. Now, that didn't make a Chinese bank un-investable. It just meant that you had to first understand what were the objectives of the Chinese government, and did those objectives of the policymakers align or misalign with your interests as an external shareholder?
And I think what we're learning now is that we're in a world where this isn't just a methodology of investing in Chinese equities, it's a methodology of investing in all equities. And maybe the US in front and center of this, that we need to understand what the objectives of our policymakers are and where do our interests potentially align or misalign.
Let me give you two examples that we've seen over the course of the last year, which I think of have drawn very stark comparison. I think there's very strong objective of the US policymakers to support and propel US energy independence. Well, what have we seen over the course of the last year? Yes, it's been magnified by events of the last month or so in the Middle East.
But we've seen the growing dominance of the energy-sector performance within equity markets, clearly supported by the strength of oil and other energy prices here recently. But understanding what the thrust is of policy, of regulation behind supporting of the industry. I would propose, if we look on the other side of this, we've seen a lot of weakness in health care equities, where health care as a sector has sort of fallen within the crosshairs of policymakers on both sides of the aisle and have really drawn into question the sustainability of certain business models and profit drivers and sources of revenues within the health care sector, particularly within the US.
So, again, I think we really have to understand that we're no longer in — if we ever were — a true sort of free market capitalism, that really is in an environment of state capitalism. And if you're in an environment of state capitalism, you better understand first and foremost what the state is trying to achieve.
Thomas Mucha: So, we used to be in a world of follow the Fed, are we now in a world of follow the swamp?
Andy Heiskell: Yes, sadly so.
Thomas Mucha: All right, Nanette, several members of the macro and multi-asset teams have suggested that global correlations may fall as the world becomes more multipolar. And, you know, from talking to me that I do think we're moving into a more multipolar world. So how real is this opportunity for diversification? And where do you see correlations generally breaking down versus just a short temporary shift?
Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson: I would say that some things are more negatively correlated and some others are more positively correlated. So, starting with negative correlations, you can certainly envision a world where individual countries are more insular in terms of their policy and trade. And therefore the dynamics that are pressing on that region are very different from another region, right? So, you know, you have a place like Germany who's a big exporter, big manufacturer, and they issued €1 trillion of fiscal stimulus, and their activity is going up and there it might be appropriate to have tighter central bank policy.
Whereas in the US there is still some chance of a rate cut. And that's partly going back to just political influence and that, we expect a new chair, Kevin Warsh, who is certainly has his has Trump's ear. So, in the US, we went from two cuts being priced in to fewer, but still a more bullish outlook.
So those are just two examples of where the rate outlook for policy rates is completely different. In a multipolar world you're going to continue to see that different regions will behave differently, which means there is a lot more global opportunity within fixed income. The area where I think you have higher correlation is between fixed income and equities.
And there, we're experiencing that in the US markets. It was dreadful in 2022 when both equities and fixed income were down around 20%. And now we're experiencing a little bit of that over this past month. So you know, that is in relation to higher inflation expectations, stickier inflation, and the chance that fiscal spending is going to increase. And so fixed income is no longer as reliable a buffer when equities sell off.
Thomas Mucha: Andy, you and I spend a lot of time together. You know that I believe fragmentation, policy disruption, geopolitical risks and geopolitical upheaval, these are all likely to be long-term tailwinds for active strategies, as Nanette just pointed out, also alternative strategies. So how do you see this as a structural inflection point for active management? And/or does it still depend heavily on manager selection implementation. Right. What's the what's the tradeoff here?
Andy Heiskell: We've gone back and looked at the correlation of global equity markets across major markets going back to the beginning of the 2000s. What's fascinating is the correlation of global equity markets rose steadily from 2000 to hit a peak in 2016.
So, we think like what happened in 2016? Well Brexit, Trump 1.0. I would argue that was the beginning of the fracturing of that era of globalization and that we've been going through something in the last ten years de-globalization, re-globalization, whatever we want to call it. But global equity markets have been steadily declining in terms of correlation over the last decade. Now, we've had fits and starts. We had a big spike in correlations around the pandemic, and then subsequently a very, very sharp decline in correlations.
So, what does this mean for active managers? Well, we've broken it down and looked at statistically the three key tenets that you want to look at as an investor to see if it's as attractive environment for active investing is: What are the correlations across markets? What's the dispersion or the range of outcomes between winners and losers? And then what's the breadth of the market; breadth being like, what percentage of stocks are outperforming the index?
And what's fascinating to us is that the correlations have been breaking down as the dispersion has been widening. So those two factors, those two key pillars would suggest a much more robust and attractive environment for active investors. Well, the third leg of the stool has completely overwhelmed everything else the last decade. We've had breadth in terms of like very, very narrow markets. The US has led the world, large cap US has led small caps, tech has led every other sector, and within tech it's been, you know, Mag Seven, hyperscalers etc. And so it's been this very, very narrow market. So as for the environment for active investing, we've had two of these three pillars really shifting very dramatically in our in our favor. But that third pillar of breadth has been the key headwind.
When does that breadth begin to turn? It goes back to the initial question you asked around valuation and expectations and outcomes. Expectations are very high relative to that continued leadership of those companies. And not to say that there's bad expectations around those, but expectations around the world are quite low on a relative basis.
You have this situation as the global order breaks down, this reflexivity of actors around the world that are sort of this opposite-and-equal reaction. It’s the fiscal spending bill in Germany. It's policy response in China or Japan or Canada or wherever it might be.
That creates interesting opportunities around the world, which I think is creating a shift around this market narrowness and this narrative. For active investors, I think that creates a much more exciting, a much more robust environment. Well, of course, within that you have to get it right. If correlations are declining and dispersion is widening, that that means, again, that the range of outcomes has widened.
Thomas Mucha: You need PMs and analysts to really listen to your geopolitical strategist, who's been arguing this for a long time.
Andy Heiskell: Exactly.
Thomas Mucha: Nanette, you mentioned gold before. We can't have a discussion about U.S exceptionalism or geopolitics without gold. But also other commodities, right? They're showing up repeatedly as beneficiaries as US exceptionalism weakens at the margin. So are these best viewed as tactical hedges, or should they be thought of as more like long-term strategic allocations?
Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson: Yeah, just speaking to gold ― and I don't want to be accused of being a gold bug for sure ― but I do think that even though we've seen a 20% pullback in gold, it's up since 2024, it's 170%. And the reason is that gold has been benefiting from several tailwinds. Central bank buying, everyone knows, has been a big one. And it goes back to your comment that when sanctions have been placed on countries, they want to have other reserves, other capital that they can deploy besides dollars. Although that has attenuated somewhat, you know, we expect that to be a pretty constant source of demand.
The other thing is that obviously gold is a unique asset. In terms of, yes, it has no cash flows, no income. But it is one of the few assets that does well when real yields fall, and if we have more inflation, you know, as we've seen in the US, real yields have actually fallen a lot, even though nominal yields are higher.
So, it really is a safe-haven asset that looks very different from the rest of the commodities complex, like industrial metals and other metals. This is probably the biggest gap that I see in portfolios, is a gap in having inflation-sensitive assets.
And yes, equities can provide that exposure for part of the way, in terms of companies being able to pass through input price rises to customers, but it can't work the whole way. And there's something really unique about this cycle, and I would call it a supercycle in commodities over the next 5 to 10 years. And that is because you have a confluence of factors that are creating more demand for commodities than there is supply.
You look at the data center buildout, what metals are required for that buildout? Basically, every metal, and the one that we're talking most about is copper. You know, when we were transitioning and certainly in Europe, this is still a case in renewables and the electrification of energy, copper is the most important input to that.
So, I think that commodities have to be thought of as a strategic asset in a portfolio that's looking at 5 to 10 years. And yes, the volatility is higher and you have to size that correctly. But if you are, like we are, concerned about sort of, you know, persistent higher inflation, this is an allocation that you really want to seriously consider.
Thomas Mucha: I'll second your point about copper. I just spent some time in South America, and I can assure you that there is a lot of interest from those countries and copper and other critical minerals. They know they have a strategic asset that's part of this broader great-power competition, that's part of this broader focus on national security. So, my geopolitical research also points to sustained demand, structural demand for commodities, critical minerals and others.
So, this has been a fantastic conversation. I'm going to wrap it up with a practical question to both of you. We'll start with you, Nanette. So, you know, if an allocator accepts that both truths of the US exceptionalism story coexist for an extended period, what does a robust portfolio look like? You know, one that can participate in continued US strength while remaining resilient if and when institutional credibility or global confidence in the United States erodes further?
Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson: So, I think that, for this US exceptionalism theme, it really behooves allocators to think about diversifying their dollar exposure. And you can do that, within the equity markets. This is really directed toward US allocators, I would own more of international equities than that benchmark weight.
We talked about, in the US really looking for opportunities within the tech sector. And leaning into active management. We still think long term, tech and innovation and the ideological superiority of the US is something that you want to preserve in your portfolio.
Within international, I really like emerging markets equities. I think that the earnings outlook for EM is, really exceeds, that of developed market international equities. And you've got such an assortment of different economies, and particularly to the commodities point, many commodities exporters, which potentially insulates you from higher inflation.
And as Andy, pointed out active management, whether that takes the form of traditional equities or in, alternative strategies like multi-strat hedge funds, macro funds. These are all taking advantage of a world where there is more volatility. The distance from one crisis to another is narrowing. And that is giving tremendous opportunities, just a rich opportunity set for active managers to partake.
And let me just add one point on fixed income, because I just want to reiterate that fixed income has a place in a portfolio, but it needs to be complemented. And that complement needs to be in much more dynamic fixed income strategies.
Thomas Mucha: You know, a lot of those, strategies you just pointed out are supported by my geopolitical read as well. A much more fragmented world is going to lead to a more dispersion of opportunities. And I think active management is quite well suited to capitalize on that.
Okay, Andy, you got the last word here.
Andy Heiskell: All right. Let's, pull out a few facts. So, over the last decade, the S&P 500 has annualized returns at just under 15% a year. The MSCI ACWI Ex-US has annualized about half of the return of the US. On top of that, the US dollar has appreciated versus other currencies and the US market equity market has had less volatility.
Investors have been incentivized to have all of their eggs in the US equity basket, and anything you did against that reduced return and added to volatility, that tends to be a bad trade. People don't like things that reduce returns and add to volatility. That's how we've ended up in this very, very concentrated position where allocators around the world are so overweight, US equities.
Thomas Mucha: Because the performance has been, dare I say, exceptional?
Andy Heiskell: The performance has been exceptional. If we also think about Sharpe ratio perspective, the US S&P 500 has on a rolling basis had a Sharpe ratio between 1 and 2 and a half for the last 15 years. Again, pretty good. I think looking forward, everything that we've discussed would suggest that future returns will likely be lower. Starting point of valuation matters and volatility will be higher, so Sharpe ratios will be lower.
So, what does an investor do in that situation when correlations are reducing there's more volatility. Well, we go back to economics 101: diversification, right? We were taught that diversification is the only free lunch. And investing. And it's been a free lunch that's given investors indigestion for the last decade. Right. We don't like that. So, we stopped doing it. I think we have to go back to that free lunch and say, now we have something, a gift in our hands that we need to take advantage of, and this diversification matters across everything. It matters across countries, across regions, across sectors, across styles, factors, everything. And I think investors really need to lean into this because just as we've seen over the course of the last year, diversification has the ability maybe even to enhance returns and reduce volatility. So, we're sort of flipping the experience of the last decade on its head.
A few other things I would just throw in and add is, and Nanette’s made reference to this, but, we've been in this environment where we haven't wanted to hedge. We haven't benefited from hedging because, again, that's just increased cost and reduced returns. If we're in this environment where lots of volatility, where maybe the total return is not as high, being hedged matters again, that helps. And so, it can be a hedge fund, or it can be just other strategies that are trying to capture dispersion like a 1-30-30 portfolio. But any sort of portfolio that allows you to capture this widening range of outcomes that is presented itself across markets.
And then simplistically, I think it means you should broaden your opportunity, set. The more narrow your opportunity set, the more you're constrained. And so, it can be just an investor shifting from a US allocation in equities to a global allocation to try to, again, take advantage of some of this dispersion volatility that exists across markets.
And then one last thing I would put out there. This is maybe just more from like a style or factor perspective. But the slow and steady wins the race. The tortoise versus the hare. Well the tortoise has gotten trounced recently. Nobody wants slow and steady when there's the hare that's just running away from everything else. And I would say the Mag Seven, hyperscalers, mega-cap tech have been the hare. They've been leading the race consistently for the last 15 years. I think we're entering into an environment where the tortoise is going to start winning a few races. And that slow and steady the compounder, and so you can think of it as is the type of sector or the type of company that maybe isn't so exciting from like a total growth perspective, but has some consistency to it in an environment where you know, consistency will be much more increasingly valued in this volatile, uncertain world.
Thomas Mucha: So, go long on volatility, diversify more, pay more attention to the tortoise.
Andy Heiskell: Yes.
Thomas Mucha: All right. Well, thank you both. It's been a fantastic conversation once again. Nanette Abuhoff Jacobson, a multi-asset strategist and Andy Heiskell, our chief equity strategist. Thanks for being here on WellSaid.
Views expressed are those of the speaker(s) and are subject to change. Other teams may hold different views and make different investment decisions. For professional/institutional investors only. Your capital may be at risk. Podcast produced April 2026.
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