- Geopolitical Strategist
Portugal, Institutional
ChangeThe views expressed are those of the speaker(s) and are subject to change. Other teams may hold different views and make different investment decisions. For professional/institutional investors only. Your capital may be at risk.
Episode notes
Our experts on Latin America discuss geopolitical shifts, economic resilience, and the region's strategic importance in global markets.
2:45 – US engagement in Latin America
4:30 – The Trump administration’s approach
7:45 – LatAm in the context of great-power competition
12:05 – Macro fundamentals and investment implications
20:30 – Venezuela and global energy
25:30 – Key takeaways on Latin America
Transcript
Andrea Alecci: And going forward, we are likely to have, you know, commodity prices bring another investment boom in many of these countries. And I think that will bring, again, strong consumption. But this time you have all this happening when the balance sheet of the country is cleaner than it was in the past ten years. So, you're going to be able to reap the benefits of this growth boom ― commodity driven ― and, you're not going to have to worry about big macroeconomic imbalances building in these countries.
Most countries in LatAm today are not expensive; this is not an expensive bunch of countries from a financial perspective. And so, you know, you have some good financial opportunities there, and the macro is clean, at least in terms of trade boom, and the assets are not excessively appreciated.
Thomas Mucha: Just as Latin American food, music, and fashion are dominating global pop culture ― with more than 135 million viewers tuning in for Bad Bunny’s Super Bowl halftime show as one example ― Latin American financial markets are also having a moment. In 2025, the MSCI Latin America Index delivered exceptionally strong performance, while LatAm bond issuance reached record levels. On the economic front, regional inflation has moderated and growth outlooks appear strong.
Now, geopolitically, the latest US National Defense Strategy and recent Trump administration actions from Argentina to Venezuela, in particular, make it abundantly clear that the region has moved from the periphery of great-power competition to its core. Meanwhile, several LatAm leaders, including Mexico's Claudia Sheinbaum and Brazil's Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, have proven to be deft negotiators, going toe to toe with the Trump administration on key issues like trade and attracting levels of political engagement not seen in decades.
So, joining me today to delve into the Latin American investment landscape are Wellington Management Macro Strategists Andrea Alecci, who joins us from our Milan office, and Gorka Lalaguna, who is here in Boston with me. Welcome to you both to WellSaid.
Andrea Alecci: Thank you, Thomas.
Gorka Lalaguna: Thanks for having us.
Thomas Mucha: Andrea, let's start with you. So, when many investors talk about, let's say, renewed US engagement in Latin America, it's often framed as being novel or reactive. But you've argued that what's happening today is more about continuity than change. So, how should we think about today's moment in the context of two centuries of US involvement in the region?
Andrea Alecci: Let me start by saying that Roosevelt, back in the early 1900s, he tried to be very hands off with respect to Latin America. At the time, there was a European embargo on Venezuela, and the US said, you know, the Europeans should take care of that, we don't want to get involved. The result was that European creditors got preferential treatment over American creditors. And that was a wakeup call and a deep learning experience for Roosevelt and for the future of US foreign policy in the region, right? Later, the number two at the State Department under Roosevelt said that us the US should control, more or less directly, Latin American revenues, which is what Trump seems to be wanting to do today with respect to Venezuela ― Gorka will have more to say about that. But, things are going that direction and there are plenty of other examples. This is not really new. The US had historically a very interventionist approach with respect to the region.
I think what is different today from the previous 20-30 years is that the US was very busy in other regions of the world. They were very busy in the Middle East, very busy in Asia, and they sort of forgot about LatAm. We had a period where the US forgot about the neighboring region and now, we are going back to the rule, not the exception. So, the exception is what we saw in the last 20-30 years.
Thomas Mucha: As you see in geopolitics, there's almost nothing new under the sun. So, this is a cyclical return to interest in the region. So Gorka, let me address the next question to you, then, Andrea, maybe you can also weigh in. But to me, the Trump administration's approach to US influence in the region seems less overtly interventionist. So, a little bit different than what Andrea was pointing out before, in the historical sense, at least, and more, let's say financial and institutional. So, my question for you, Gorka, is: Do you agree with that? And how effective has this shift towards financial assistance and economic engagement been in your view?
Gorka Lalaguna: Thanks, Thomas. I wouldn't say less interventionist, but I think the flavor of the intervention and the nature of the conversation, it's different, right? So, for example, in the case of Venezuela, what you are seeing is not necessarily pulling away from an intervention, but doing it so in a most cost-minimizing way, right? So, boots on the ground were a red line for Trump administration that was flagged over the course of this process. And the decision to stick with Delcy Rodriguez and the interim authorities points to the direction of: we want to preserve stability, we want access to the energy resources, but we want to limit our engagement to different economic levers that we can pull, to your point, and basically the credible threat, in the case of Venezuela, of military action. You've also seen, the conversations around Panama, around the canal authorities. In the case of Mexico, where the conversation around USMCA is pushing policy directions towards tariffs on Asian countries, such as China. Also, more thorough security cooperation. You saw that, for example, in Argentina with the financial assistance which, Andrea can probably talk further. So, I wouldn't say that the bias is to intervene less. I’m saying the flavor of the intervention is different.
Thomas Mucha: Andrea, do you agree with that?
Andrea Alecci: Yes, absolutely. I think, you know, the case of Panama, I think is quite a good illustration of this. At the beginning of Trump's second term, he was very, very focused on the Panama Canal, on re-taking the Panama Canal, right? And, you know, I've been covering Panama for many years and I don’t think there were any big issues in the way the canal was managed by the Panamanians. But, there are two ports at the beginning, at the end of the canal that were managed by a Hong Kong company. But then since Hong Kong became much more influenced by China, you know, we can say that those Chinese companies that manage those two ports, and what Trump and Rubio said is that this is unacceptable that the Chinese manage such a strategic asset in the region. So, what I would say, the approach ― the so-called “Don-roe doctrine” ― it’s about the US not accepting that, a non-aligned country control a strategic asset in a neighboring region. And this is what this doctrine is about. In the Panama Canal, the solution was an institutional solution. What happened was that a Panamanian court ruled that the Chinese company violated the law in Panama. And the concession was taken away from the Chinese company. There will likely be a big arbitration case about the issue. I wouldn't say that it’s a very clean institutional outcome. I think there are some people that have doubts about the rule of law. This was a very critical outcome from the US standpoint. So, definitely intervention is there; it’s not military, it’s more financial.
Thomas Mucha: Andrea, you're bringing up a topic that's near and dear to my heart, a common theme on this podcast, which is, US great-power competition with China. And it's been clear to me that the actions of this administration certainly have that relationship in mind with, you know, with Panama, with Colombia, with Argentina, with Venezuela. And, Gorka, what I'm hearing from the administration, what I'm hearing from other analysts is US great-power competition with China is often portrayed as a zero-sum game, right? But you've taken a more nuanced view, and you've been suggesting that this rivalry could actually benefit Latin America. So, in your view, how does US-China competition over resources, over infrastructure, and influence, change the region's opportunity set?
Gorka Lalaguna: What I would say, and I think it's important in the Latin America conversation, is that the region has variance. So, when you're discussing Mexico, it's different to discussing Brazil. And you discuss Costa Rica different than Venezuela. And to this particular point, I think it's worth separating the block in two.
When you look at Mexico and the Central American economies, they're more geared towards the US markets. So, the opportunity that has opened for them, which is clear in the case of Mexico, for example, is that in a scenario where the US is trying to bring closer supply chains to the region and closer to them with more reliable allies, this opens up the possibility for economic integration to a US market.
In the case of Mexico, for example, where you have USMCA, this becomes critical to a point of developing the non-auto-manufacturing sector. You already have human capital there, one of the most complex export baskets in the world. So, I think in the region, I mean I can speak more on the South American bit of this, is that in the end, having access to a US market or a bias to having more preferential access to the US market opens up an opportunity set for, for example, Mexico, or Central American economies that have already got their trade agreements, which is Guatemala, which is El Salvador. And you see also the potential for this being an institutional opportunity. For example, in Guatemala, you have the US helping with the construction of port infrastructure. In the case of El Salvador, you have the security cooperation. So, this not only opens up the opportunity set of the products on the markets, but also lends a hand for these countries in the region to enhance their institutional perspective.
Thomas Mucha: Andrea, South America in particular, sits at the, the center of this great-power competition, right? The global demand for energy, agricultural products, of course, critical minerals. So, in your view, how does that resource endowment change the region's leverage today? And let's compare it with past cycles. And do you think governments in the region are using that leverage wisely?
Andrea Alecci: From a perspective of Southern American nation that produces commodities, in the past most of the concessions were given to, you know, Chinese companies, occasionally Canadian companies, right? The greater involvement of US foreign investors in the region should be seen as a long-term positive. US companies are sensitive to social issues, and, they are likely to invest more in local communities, alongside mining developments. So, if US companies can prove that there is a strong benefit in partnering with them or good social development of those communities, that that would increase the chances of success that those mineral resources are extracted mineral resources are exploited. So, I'm very optimistic about this greater US involvement in the region.
To take on your second question, you know, the good thing of LatAm, you know, political leaders, they are aware of the resources that their countries have, they are not using these as leverage in a negative way. I think LatAm is about partnerships with the world. Where I think the leverage comes in is when you had political pressure from certain countries. Smart leaders are leveraging these endowments in a smart way. Business prevails. And I think in that sense, a region like LatAm, of leaders that do not seek confrontation, but think partnership, is very well positioned in today's global context.
Thomas Mucha: Well, that's a good transition, Andrea, to the investment implications here. And I want to start with the macro fundamentals. And Gorka, let's begin with you. What's been in your mind the dominant growth model, particularly in Mexico, Central America, for the past 20 years? And how did that evolve over the previous ten? And how do you see it moving forward?
Gorka Lalaguna: I would say that the growth model of Mexico, and Central American economies, it's significantly different than the one in South America. So, basically, I'll take Mexico as an example. So, Mexico after setting the first free trade agreement with the US basically has geared the entire business model of the country toward servicing the US market in different fronts, from manufacturing, and other elements. And basically that's been the key engine of growth. And that's why, for example, USMCA stands as the most critical milestone for the Mexican economy
What I would mention in the last years is that this model, when you map it out with governance, weakness, and institutional issues that this region particularly has, with low productivity, low accumulation of capital, you see some disappointing results in growth rates, for example, you see it in Mexico. After the Lopez Obrador administration took office, Mexico has been struggling to grow, and I wouldn't say that that's necessarily tied to the macro framework of the country, but most on the micro issues that the country faces, right? The institutional issues, the rule of law, the declining productivity, rigid labor markets. And I think that's when you look at the region as a whole, as I mentioned before, you can get some preferential access to the US market, and I think they're still geared to an extent. But I think the challenge going forward then, based on the experience in the past, is how do you address these micro issues, right? Security, rule of law, property rights that are poorly enforced in this region as a whole.
There are silver linings. A lot of these countries have, when you look at the region in general, excluding Mexico, you're seeing significant reform efforts. You’re seeing Costa Rica, who is now in the conversation of becoming an investment grade credit similar to Guatemala, where they're making efforts cooperating with the US. So, what I would say is that these countries have to some extent cleaned their macro outlook and macro frameworks and now their biggest challenge going forward is to make this sustainable and more successful growth stories. Mexico is the most critical example of that.
Thomas Mucha: Andrea, how does that fit with your view of the trajectory of South American countries? And obviously there's a lot of diversity across the region, but how do you think about the history and then the future?
Andrea Alecci: Yes, Latin America, Southern Americans, these are countries that had a strong boost when China joined the WTO. This was in the beginning of this century. And China brought a lot of demand for commodities and, there was a strong increase in prices of commodities, in volumes of commodities. And that resulted in strong investment to reap the benefit of this commodity boom and that brought consumption. And on top of that, you had several leftist leaders that also pushed the accelerator of public spending. And that resulted in very, very strong growth in the first ten years of this century, right?
Then the music changed. China started importing less, demand in China plateaued. There were a bunch of crises in China, and there was too much infrastructure being built in that in the first ten years of the century. And then less infrastructure being built, it was a property crisis, etcetera. I mean, we know this story in China. And so LatAm suffered tremendously. From 2010 to 2020, several countries had the 0% growth rate on average ― Argentina, Brazil.
And at this point, what are we likely to have in the future? I think, first, as Gorka said, countries went through fiscal crisis from 2010 to 2020, and most countries cleaned their balance sheets. I mean, there are exceptions, obviously ― Brazil, it’s hard to say that Brazil’s fiscal balance sheet is clean, but, you know, there could be like some moderation fiscal imbalances going forward ― in Argentina you had fiscal deficits for the past 20-30 years and now you have a president that is very committed to deliver a balanced budget. In Chile, you have Kast, a conservative leader that has promised to reduce fiscal spending. So, in general, the macro balance sheet is much cleaner.
And going forward, we are likely to have, you know, commodity prices bring another investment boom in many of these countries. And I think that will bring, again, strong consumption. But this time you have all this happening when the balance sheet of the country is cleaner than it was in the past ten years. So, you're going to be able to reap the benefits of this growth boom ― commodity driven ― and, you're not going to have to worry about big macroeconomic imbalances building in this country.
Most countries in LatAm today are not expensive; this is not an expensive bunch of countries from a financial perspective. And so, you know, you have some good financial opportunities there, and the macro is clean, at least in terms of trade boom, and the assets are not excessively appreciated.
Thomas Mucha: So Gorka, Andrea has just outlined a bunch of structural factors that are positive for South America in particular. Do you have anything to add from your lens of Mexico, Central America?
Gorka Lalaguna: Yeah, I would say when I look at the region ― I’ll start with Central America. What I'm seeing on these countries, and I was just there last week, is when you meet with authorities, the private sector, etc., you actually see a significant effort of reform. In different flavors, with different challenges, but when you look at the entirety of the region, there seems to be a concerted effort to get there on the macro outlook, increase their governance, and you just need to look at where the composition of these countries are and where they are now.
So, for example, Costa Rica, a few years ago was in the middle of a debt crisis. Now, it's in the conversation of when do they become an investment grade credit? And this is on the back, not only of an improved macro performance, but Costa Rica has managed to achieve close to 4 or 5 years’ of primary surpluses and a strong external balance sheet and growth above 4%.
When you look at Guatemala, for example, you see a significant legislation effort being put forward to address money laundering issues. There's an effort there in El Salvador. You enter an IMF program, security has been addressed. Now it's a conversation of how can you sustain this consolidation? And when are we going to see the dividends of this, which we're starting to see right now? Panama, the same. The new administration came with a bias to actually move forward on the fiscal accounts.
So, when you look at the flavor of what's happening in that particular part of the world, I see a constructive bias to addressing these issues. I'm not saying it's going to be easy. The starting point is, is weak, when you look at, for example, countries like Honduras, El Salvador, the conversation about rule of law and governance has been there all along, and there are ways to go there. I think it's easier for you to work around the fiscal than these issues of educating people. That takes time. But I'm constructive on the outlook there.
And in the case of Mexico, it's trickier because in a sense what you need to do is address some micro issues that are constraining growth in this economy to analyze investment and yield growth, that it's above 2%, right? Naturally, when you see the Sheinbaum administration, they took office and they have been facing immediate challenge that they needed to address. You were coming from a weak fiscal standpoint. And on top of that, you have the Trump administration. I think she's been extremely successful in tackling these issues, delivering some sort of consolidation and growth seems to be picking up. But the next step is USMCA. For Mexico is existential, and they need to get over the hump to maintain the preferential access to the US. But after all of that is clear, you enter the conversation of, okay, what do we need to do to resume growth. In Mexico, it's not an issue of the central bank or the fiscal policy on its own, it’s: What we do on the ground to actually help align the incentives for more investment on the ground, more flexibility in markets? And that's an issue that's been there for a while. The question is: How you tackle the political capabilities and willingness to do it? Right? So, the region, I think has an opportunity. It's well positioned. The window is there. It's a question of how you tackle these issues that unfortunately are the hardest to tackle, in my opinion.
Thomas Mucha: Well, Gorka, speaking of hard issues to tackle, I'm going to move to Venezuela. You are talking to the firm's geopolitical strategist, so you knew this question was coming. But, you know, Venezuela, of course, has reemerged as a strategic issue for the US, also for global energy markets. So, how are you assessing Venezuela's trajectory politically, economically, a lot of those challenges that you just mentioned? And in your mind and in your mind, what would our realistic normalization scenario look like in Venezuela?
Gorka Lalaguna: I want to start by saying that I'm Venezuelan, and it's been only six weeks, but it's feels like a lifetime in events. Any positive conversation around the country going forward, to me, inherently passes for the country achieving a democratic transition down the line.
There are nuances on how you get there. What I think that has to be the core argument when discussing Venezuela, all of this conversation on the potential of the oil sector or any idea of a debt restructuring down the line and the prospect of increasing Venezuela's standard of living in a sustained matter within the interim happens, and goes to addressing the legitimacy question that is not answered at this point.
So, to me, that's the normative end point where we want to get to. And if you take at face value the Trump administration's plan, it's a three-phase approach. So, you first have this, the stability depart. Then you have a reconstruction or reconciliation bit. And then you have a transition. This can overlap.
I don't think it's going to it's clear enough in where we are now. And how do we mark the beginning and end of these stages? But what I would say is that the approach to the Trump administration, to this issue has been pragmatic, and they are paying a price for stabilization.
So, they decided we have to work with the interim authorities to actually get a firmer grip on the oil sector and guarantee some stability after the operation that took Maduro from office. But I would say that strategy has a limited scope. Why am I saying this? Because the institutional arrangement that you have currently in place in Venezuela excludes significant actors that make that clearly unstable.
So, for example, you don't have any representative of the opposition in the table, in the conversation with the US. Maria Corina Machado, which is the opposition leader, is in exile and with no clear timeline for returning. So, Venezuela is undergoing these significant changes. You have a new hydrocarbon law. You have reforms, being part of the National Assembly. But this is being done without the legitimacy that a representative government would provide. So, the question that Venezuelans are facing is: When are you going to end up in a process that has a more solid political footing on the ground?
Thomas Mucha: What's an appropriate time horizon for these three phases that you just laid out, or the administration has laid out? Is this months, years? I mean, what's a reasonable assumption?
Gorka Lalaguna: I think we've seen different statements. So, for example, Secretary Wright was in Venezuela, last week, and he has mentioned that elections should happen in the next 18-to-24-month period. Maria Corina Machado has said that if you want to have a free and fair election and build the conditions, you would need at least ten months. So again, to this point on these institutional arrangements yielding one more stable with more political footing, things need to happen first to get to that point.
But I agree that elections are the end game, right? I think the 18-month timeline seems fair. This is all conditional on what reforms get us there. You need a new electoral authority. You need new judges. You need exiles allowed to return. You need political prisoners released. And so far, we are not seen to the extent that we would like ― me, as a Venezuelan ― that happening.
Recent polls have came out in Venezuela, and there's two clear trends that I see. Venezuelans want elections in the next year. And Machado on the opposition leader, has a close to 70% approval, which is in line with the results of 2024 election. So, I think the Trump administration challenge is to handle this sequence of stabilization, reconstruction, and transition, where so far the opposition has not been involved with this willingness of the people to actually address this legitimacy.
Gorka Lalaguna: The way that goes forward, we'll know if we end up in this outcome of a democratic transition.
Thomas Mucha: How does the energy piece of this fit into it? I mean, do we need to see this stabilization on the domestic political side before we get significant reinvestment in the industry?
Gorka Lalaguna: I think, in the end, the scope of what this particular arrangement can yield is limited. When you look at Exxon CEO statements in the White House meeting with President Trump, it's clear that you need the representation question addressed. You need a government that has a mandate to actually pull the reforms that make this agreement stable.
So, with a government that has extreme questions and legitimacy and they lost an election in 2024, right? So, I'm not I'm an oil expert. But if I wanted to, if I want to invest the amounts that Venezuela's industry need to reach 2 million barrels up, you need this addressed so that you have stability in their agreements.
Thomas Mucha: Okay, well, I'm going to end this fascinating discussion with a big picture question for both of you, and Andrea, I'm going to start with you. So, if listeners here take away, you know, one big idea about Latin America's geopolitical and financial role in the global system over the next decade, you know, what should that big idea be?
Andrea Alecci: I would say, Thomas, that LatAm is a global partner. It provides resources to countries across the globe. It’s a region that doesn’t seek confrontation, but partnership and, it’s a region also that, if you see the voter trends and especially when the voters care about, they care about more security. And if you achieve better security, they will give more votes to conservative leaders that historically have been tougher on crime ― that will also benefit financial markets, right? Because you would have a more market friendly policy. And that coupled together with, strong terms of trade boost, from strong, commodity prices should leader to better growth prospects in the next ten years.
Thomas Mucha: And, Gorka, I'll give the final word to you here. What's the one big idea that you want listeners to take away over the next decade or so?
Gorka Lalaguna: You're actually seeing a significant share of these countries engaging in reform effort that it's aligning itself with an opportunity to do more integration to a US market, which for them is critical. So, it seems that, with the nuances of how this last year has been, the window has coincided with them actually cleaning their macro framework and trying to take a step back, okay, let's improve our governance and make these efforts, right? Each with their own constraints, but I think that bias is there.
So, if I look at the region in general, they have a significant window of opportunity, and I think the capabilities are there to actually push reforms that drive growth higher. The capabilities are there, the potential is there, and I think the political sentiment it's aligning to this bias to prevail on the economic policy.
And I think that pragmatism, it's also a critical part of the conversation. I think this window can be capitalized and I think you're seeing signs of that in, in different governments, in different authorities, at least for my part of the world, that’s the idea I would leave.
Thomas Mucha: Gentlemen, thank you both so much for your expertise, and clarity on a really diverse, really interesting, really dynamic region. I'm actually headed down to South America myself for a couple of weeks ― Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil. So, thank you for helping me do my research ahead of that trip. But that in and of itself is another indication of just how important I think the region is becoming from geopolitical, policy, and market perspectives. So, thanks once again, Macro Strategists Andrea Alecci and Gorka Lalaguna, thank you for joining us on WellSaid.
Andrea Alecci: Thanks for having me, Thomas.
Gorka Lalaguna: Thanks for having us.
Views expressed are those of the speaker(s) and are subject to change. Other teams may hold different views and make different investment decisions. For professional/institutional investors only. Your capital may be at risk. Podcast produced April 2026.
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