After the financial crisis, central bankers lost confidence in these models, so they turned to the neutral rate to help set policy as they slowly normalized interest rates. Between 2015 and 2018, the Fed gradually raised rates, aiming to align them with their new favorite policy aid: r-star.
Policymakers assumed that financial markets would indicate when policy was too restrictive better than inflation could. This explains the Fed’s U-turn on interest rates throughout 2019 after a stock market selloff in late 2018. Estimates of a lower neutral rate were also used to justify negative policy rates throughout the euro zone in the 2010s as neither financial markets nor inflation showed signs of excess. More recently, several Fed officials have described current policy as slightly restrictive, meaning that interest rates are higher than their long-term estimate of neutral.
Warsh has taken a dimmer view of the neutral rate’s usefulness. In 2018, he described it as nothing more than “a useful fiction.”
“In my view, r-star is not a beacon in the sky but a chimera in the eye…It is unobservable, unpredictable, imprecise, and highly variable,” he wrote in The Wall Street Journal. “That makes it a poor guide for policymakers.”
While Chairman Warsh plays his cards close to the vest, I believe he wants the Fed to return to a simpler definition of restrictiveness, one measured by how tight policy rates are relative to medium-term inflation expectations.
If that is the case, the Fed raised interest rates in September because it wasn’t confident inflation would return to its 2% target, given rising AI-driven spending and commodity prices. Because expectations for inflation rose, the policy was, by Warsh’s definition, not as restrictive as it was before. This could explain the disparity between Warsh and other committee members. While they were comparing policy rates against the neutral rate, Warsh was comparing rates with expected inflation.
Warsh’s framework has several implications for monetary policy. Most significantly, moving away from neutral-rate targeting increases the likelihood of near-term hikes.
It is rare for central bankers to raise interest rates in response to a supply shock like the one produced by the Iran war. Historically, they could justify their inaction by arguing that monetary policy tools aren’t very good at responding to commodity price shocks or that such shocks didn’t alter the economy’s neutral rate. If the Warsh Fed is more focused on expectations of inflation and less on the neutral rate, they might be more reactive to supply shocks.